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CHARTER ORGANIZERS AND TOUR OPERATORS:
AIR CARRIERS OR TICKET AGENTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years American vacationers have discovered that they may obtain
significant savings in the price of air travel by taking advantage of low cost
charter flights offered by various air travel clubs. I Most of these travel clubs
own and operate their own aircraft and, until recently, have escaped
economic regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).2 However, with
the regularly scheduled airlines facing serious economic problems, the CAB
has moved to restrict such "cheap" air travel provided through travel clubs
and charter flights.
3
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958' (the Act) charges the CAB with the
economic welfare of the air industry. When Congress enacted the Act's
predecessor, 5 it was faced with potentially destructive competition in an
industry which required large investments of capital and regular, but not
necessarily profitable, service. 6 Congress gave the Board responsibility for the
"promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at
1. For example, a traveler may obtain round-trip air fare between Seattle and Brussels for only
$250, a savings of nearly $450 over normal airline fares. Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
2. Id.; Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
982 (1974); see 7 Ind. L. Rev. 737 (1974).
3. CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 390 (2d Cir. 1975). See Pillai. Government
Regulation in the Private Interest, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 29, 34-35 (1974); Russell, The CAB and
the Consumer, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 51, 56 (1974). For an excellent but somewhat dated economic
analysis of the regulated air industry, see R. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators (1962).
4. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the 1958 Act].
5. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [hereinafter cited as the 1938 Act]. The
1958 Act is substantially a recodification of the 1938 Act, as amended.
6. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982
(1974); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430,432-33(9th Cir., cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885
(1962)). "The scheduled air carriers.. . because they provide the country with a 'dependable and
predictable air transportation service at all times, one that operates in peak and off-peak periods, to
large cities and to small ones and in dense and thin traffic markets,'... are admittedly at an economic
disadvantage when competing against charter services. Whereas the 'load factor' (average
percentage of occupancy) of charterflights is near 100 percent, scheduled service normally operates at
an average of 50 percent" Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284, 1287 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For a general study of the legislative history of the 1938 Act, see C. Rhyne, The Civil Aeronautics Act
Annotated (1939), especially chs. 8, 9, and 11. See also Pillal, Government Regulation in the Private
Interest, 40J. Air L. & Com. 29 (1974) ("The Federal Aviation Act... was drafted at a meeting of air
carrier representatives held in a Washington hotel in late January and February of 1937."); Dept. of
Justice Bull. at 10 (Feb. 6, 1975) (Testimony of Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice, Before the Senate Ad. Practices Subcomm., concerning Airline
Regulation by the CAB) [hereinafter cited as Kauper] ("The protection of a subsidized air mail system
was a vital objective of the drafters of the 1938 Act.").
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reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or
advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices."
'7
Air carriers which operate aircraft in flight are divided into two broad
categories: regularly scheduled carriers which issue individual tickets to
passengers, and supplemental air carriers which sell the capacity of an
aircraft to an individual or group. 8 A regularly scheduled carrier files its
routes, 9 flight times,10 and tariffs" for CAB approval and must adhere to
these schedules'? regardless of whether the plane is full. In return for this
often unprofitable service, the Board allows these air carriers to be relatively
free from competition from other airlines. 13 The Board accomplishes this
through its regulation of fares and services so as to insure only slight
variations from carrier to carrier and by its control of the assignment and use
of air routes. 14
In competition with regularly scheduled carriers are supplemental airlines
which provide efficient and economical transportation by operating at full
capacity on flexible schedules and routes.' s Charter organizers, tour
operators, travel agents and travel clubs promote charter flights on supple-
mental air carriers for the cost conscious consumer.
The differing methods of operation of the regularly scheduled and supple-
mental air carriers illustrate the inherent conflict in the statutory duties of the
CAB. The CAB must promote regular, dependable scheduled air service yet
it must also promote economical and efficient service to the traveling con-
sumer.
After nearly forty years of regulating the air industry, the CAB is under
pressure from consumer advocates' 6 and the Department of Justice' 7 to
provide less expensive air fares and to promote greater efficiency within the
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970); see Comment, Presidential Powers over the Awarding of
International Air Routes, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1176 (1974).
8. Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 483 F.2d 1284, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1973). A third category
consists of regularly scheduled air carriers which also operate charter flights. 14 C.F.R. § 207.1
(1975); Booth, Chartered Flights and Scheduled Airlines, 4 Transp. L.J. 127, 131 (1972).
9. 14 C.F.R. § 201.4(c)(3) (1975).
10. Id. § 202.14(b) (1975).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
12. Id. § 1373(b) (1970); 14 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1975).
13. See generally R. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators 140-68 (1962); Dept. of Justice
Bull. (Feb. 18, 1975) (Testimony of Donald I. Baker, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice, Before Senate Subcomm. on Ad. Practice and Procedure
concerning Federal Regulation of Route Awards and Entry Into the Airline Industry) [hereinafter
cited as Baker].
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970) (tariffs of air carriers); Id. § 1371(e)-(j) (1970) (routes of air
carriers). See generally Baker, supra note 13.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. E.g., Booth, Chartered Flights and Scheduled Airlines, 4 Transp. L.J. 127 (1972); Pilla,
Government Regulation in the Private Interest, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 29 (1974); Russell, The CAB
and the Consumer, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 51 (1974). But see Diederich, Protection of Consumer
Interests under the Federal Aviation Act, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 1 (1974).
17. Kauper, supra note 6.
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industry. The regularly scheduled air carriers and the supplemental air
carriers, both of which own and operate the aircraft, are clearly subject to
CAB jurisdiction under the Act.' 8 The "ticket agent" who only sells passage
on a flight is subject to very limited CAB regulation. 9 But the role of air
travel clubs, charter organizers, and tour operators20 is less clearly defined
and these organizations have opposed comprehensive CAB regulation 2 ' on
the grounds that they are merely ticket agents as opposed to air carriers as
contended by the CAB.2 2 The definition of their role within the air industry
will probably determine their economic existence for if the charter promoters
are air carriers as the CAB contends, they would be forced to operate within
the strict limits of CAB regulations with the result that their services would
become unattractive and/or unavailable to a large part of the traveling public.
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970); see, e.g., Diederich, Protection of Consumer Interests under the
Federal Aviation Act, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 1, 4-8 (1974).
19. See notes 31-37 infra and accompanying text; Diederich, Protection of Consumer Interests
under the Federal Aviation Act, 40 J. Air L. & Com. 1, 7 (1974).
20. Except for air travel clubs, the Board has defined each of these parties in its regulations.
To avoid confusion with the terms as defined by the regulations, they will be referred to
hereinafter as "charter arrangers", unless specifically named in a source.
The Board gives a very limited meaning to each of the terms it uses. Under 14 C.F.R.
§§ 207.11,208.6 (1975), charter flights are limited to air transportation pursuant to a Dept. of Defense
contract, to air transportation where the capacity of an aircraft is engaged by a person for his own
use, or to an agentof agroup of charter participants, an air freight forwarder, a study group charterer
under Id. §§ 373.1-.31 (1975), an overseas military personnel charter operator under Id.
§§ 372.1-.40 (1975), a travel group charter organizer pursuant to Id. §§ 372a.1-.30
(1975) or a tour operator under Id. §§ 378.1-.31 (1975). An additional classification is the
travel agent who engages "in the formation of groups for transportation or in the solicitation orsale of
transportation services." Id. § 207.1 (1975). The only regulations expressly applicable to
travel agents prohibit the "travel agent from receiving a commission from both the air carrier and the
charterer, and... [require] atravel agent to execute a part of [an information report] to the effect that
it has acted in a manner consistent with Part 207 of the Board's regulations." CAB v. Carefree
Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 387 n.21 (2d Cir. 1975).
The Board is careful not to expressly call these charter arrangers indirect air carriers or ticket
agents. Instead it defines each party in terms of its relationship to the charter contract, and then,
without stating that the arranger is an indirect air carrier, it grants an exemption from the
requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity which is required of indirect air
carriers. Providing this exemption moots the issue of the charter arranger's status until the charter
arranger is found to be in violation of the regulations. At that point, the charter arranger claims
that it was never subject to the regulations because it was a ticket agent rather than an indirect
air carrier.
But see Diederich, Protection of Consumer Interests under the Federal Aviation Act, 40 J. Air
L. & Com. 1, 4-5 (1974): "Within the class of indirect air carriers are such persons as air freight
forwarders, cooperative shippers associations, and charter operators who provide inclusive tour
charters, overseas military personnel charters, travel group charters or study group charters. The
Board has also found a number of travel agents, organizations, and individuals to be operating as
indirect air carriers ... . "(footnotes omitted). Mr. Diederich is an enforcement attorney with the
CAB.
21. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974) (air
travel dub); see CAB v. Aeromatic Travel Corp., 489 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1974) (travel agencies).
22. See, e.g., CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975).
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This Note will analyze the legislation, regulations and case law relevant to air
carriers with the goal of providing guidelines which may facilitate a more
precise definition of air carrier and thereby assist in the categorization of the
various types of charter organizers and tour operators.
II. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires air carriers to have a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, 23 or an exemption 24 and once either is
granted, the air carrier must conform to the Board's regulations. 25 These
regulations severely restrict price competition among regularly scheduled
carriers and even competition in services-seating configurations, meals, time
of departure, movies, etc.-is subject to Board regulation. 26
Ticket agents on the other hand are subject to much less regulation by the
Board. A ticket agent is forbidden to engage in "unfair or deceptive practices
or unfair methods of competition.12 7 But a ticket agent may conduct its
business without Board authorization whereas an air carrier must obtain
express authorization from the Board.
The term "air carrier" is defined in section 101(3) of the Act as "any citizen
of the United States who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a
lease or any other arrangement, to engage in air transportation .... ,,28 Air
transportation is defined as "the carriage by aircraft of persons or property as
a common carrier for compensation or hire ....
On the other hand, ticket agent is defined in section 101(35) as "any person,
not an air carrier ... and not a bona fide employee of an air carrier ... who,
as principal or agent, sells or offers for sale any air transportation, or
negotiates for, or holds himself out by solicitation, advertisement, or other-
wise as one who sells, provides, furnishes, contracts or arranges for, such
transportation." 30
23. "No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a certificate
issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such transportation." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a) (1970).
24. An exemption from the requirement of a certificate is authorized under Id.
§ 1301(3) (1970); see note 20 supra; American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir.
1949); Railway Express Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 541 (1941).
25. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1970).
26. E.g., Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, No. 73-1718 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 7,
1974) (CAB abused its discretion in mandating certain seating configurations). See R. Caves, Air
Transport and Its Regulators, chs. 14-15 (1962).
27. "The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any air carrier, foreign air
carrier, or ticket agent ... investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier,
or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition in air transportation or the sale thereof. If the Board shall find . . . that such air
carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent is engaged in such unfair or deceptive practices or
unfair methods of competition, it shall order such air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent to
cease and desist from such practices or methods of competition." 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
28. Id. § 1301(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
29. Id. § 1301(21) (1970). " 'Air transportation' means interstate, overseas, or foreign air
transportation or the transportation of mail by aircraft." Id. § 1301(10) (1970).
30. Id. § 1301(37) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
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The term "ticket agent" was added to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 by
amendment in 1952.31 The sparse legislative history of the 1952 amendment
indicates that Congress sought to end misleading advertisements, misrep-
resentations of the quality and kind of transportation, and the sales of tickets
at prices above tariff rates, or without a commitment from an air carrier to
provide the service ticketed. 32
The 1952 amendment defined "ticket agent" and added that term to
sections 41133 and 902(d).34 Section 411 requires fair competitive methods and
practices and authorizes the Board to issue orders to cease and desist from
offending practices. 35 Section 902(d) provides criminal penalties for the giving
of rebates or concessions on the sale of air transportation in violation of the
AcL 36 The 1952 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board indicates the
Board's intent in submitting the amendment:
As previously written, sections 411 and 902 related only to air carriers. Consequently,
that part of the Board enforcement program involving ticket agents was one of
indirection, and was accomplished by instituting against carriers proceedings for
violation of ticket agency regulations, and for certain other practices of their agents
attributable to them. Direct proceedings against ticket agents were limited to situations
where it could be established that the agent himself was undertaking to engage in air
transportation. 3 7
The definitions of air carrier and ticket agent appear to overlap. An air
carrier directly or indirectly engages in the carriage of persons or property as a
common carrier for compensation or hire. 38 The air carrier sells air transpor-
tation as a principal and holds itself out to the public as one who sells,
31. Act of July 14, 1952, Pub. L. No. 538, 66 Stat. 628.
32. H.R. Rep. No. 2420, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1952). Prior to the amendment, the Board
had attempted to regulate ticket agents by forcing air carriers to alter their relationships with
irresponsible ticket agents. The Board also attempted to prove that persons engaged in the sale of
air transportation were technically within the classification indirect air carrier as such term was
defined in the act. Id. at 8.
33. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
34. Id. § 1472(d) (1970).
35. Id. § 1381 (1970); see note 27 supra.
36. "Any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent . . . who shall, knowingly and
willfully, offer, grant, or give... any rebate or other concession in violation of the provisions of
this chapter, or who, by any device or means, shall, knowingly and willfully, assist . . . any
person to obtain transportation or services subject to this chapter at less than the rates, fares, or
charges lawfully in effect, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be subject for each offense to a fine of not less than $100 and not more than SS,000." 49
U.S.C. § 1472(d) (1970).
37. 1952 CAB Ann. Rep. 33-34.
38. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text. Although not used in connection with
ticket agents, the word "indirectly" was commented upon by the Board in Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 537 (1941): "The use of the word 'indirectly,' in addition to the terms
'directly' and 'by lease or any other arrangement,' appears to represent a studied effort to make the
scope of the definition extremely broad." Cf. CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No. 74 C 915 at
49 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975); also CAB v. Aeromatic Travel
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The definition of the term 'air carrier' is a broad
one .. . .").
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provides, or furnishes such transportation. This is basically the definition of a
ticket agent.39 Reconciliation of the two terms can center only on the phrase
"not an air carrier" appearing in the definition of ticket agent.
Ill. CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR CARRIERS
A. Legislative Intent and Initial Construction.
By usage, air carriers have been classified as either direct or indirect.40 A
direct air carrier provides the aircraft, flight crew and physical in-flight
operation of the aircraft in air transportation. 4 1 Both regularly scheduled and
supplemental airlines are direct air carriers.
42
The problem arises in ascertaining the scope of "indirectly or by a lease or
any other arrangement" in section 101(3) of the Act. When the definition of air
carrier was first codified in 1938, Congress was concerned primarily with the
regulation of direct air carriers. 43 The inclusion of the phrase "or indirectly"
was an apparent attempt to include air freight forwarders within the defini-
tion of air carrier. The early interstate commerce acts had regulated any
common carrier by railroad 4 4 and the courts consistently had held that freight
forwarders, who consolidated packages for shipment by the railroads, were
not included in the definition and thus not within the scope of these statutes.4 5
39. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
40. There is no statutory phrase "direct air carrier" or "indirect air carrier." The phrase is
"whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any other arrangement ...... 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3)
(1970). The interpretation of the disjunctive "or" has been less than precise. Some have divided
air carriers into two classes: "directly" and "indirectly or by lease or any other arrangement."
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 536 (1941); accord, Group Tour Excursion Fares,
44 C.A.B. 803 n.4 (1966). A more recent decision indicated that the term air carrier included "not
only those persons who engage directly in air transportation but also those who so engage 'by
lease or any other arrangement'; that is, 'indirect air carriers'." CAB v. Aeromatic Travel Corp.,
341 F. Supp. 1271, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The court in CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No.
74 C 915 at 43 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975) said that a
defendant "was indirectly undertaking to engage in air transportation 'by a lease or any other
arrangement' . .. ."
Most cases have talked simply of direct air carriers or indirect air carriers, ignoring "or by a
lease or any other arrangement." E.g., CAB v. Aeromatic Travel Corp., 489 F.2d 251, 252 (2d
Cir. 1974); National Air Taxi Conf., Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane Sys., Inc., 31 C.A.B. 41, 43
(1960).
41. Group Tour Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803 n.4 (1966) (actually operating the flight
equipment); Hacienda Hotels-U.S. Aircoach, 26 C.A.B. 372, 378 (1958) (provide aircraft, flight
crew and physical in-flight operation of aircraft).
42. See, e.g., Diederich, Protection of Consumer Interests under the Federal Aviation Act, 40
J. Air L. & Com. 1, 4 (1974).
43. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903, 909 (7th Cir. 1949); accord, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483, 495 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally, C. Rhyne,
The Civil Aeronautics Act Annotated (1939); Kauper, supra note 6, at 10.
44. E.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379.
45. United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 431 (1924); Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 188 (1920); Southern Ind. Express Co. v. United States Express
Co., 88 F. 659, 662 (C.C.D. Ind. 1898), aff'd mem., 92 F. 1022 (7th Cir. 1899).
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Freight forwarders were within the ambit of only those statutes which
specifically included them. 46
In August, 1935, Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Act4 7 which defined
"common carrier by motor vehicle" as: "any person who or which undertakes,
whether directly or by a lease or any other arrangement, to transport
passengers or property . . . for the general public in interstate or foreign
commerce by motor vehicle for compensation . . . . 48 Cases decided by the
I.C.C. described express companies and freight forwarders as "indirect opera-
tions" and held that they were not common carriers within this definition. 49
When the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was enacted, Congress used the
language of the Motor Carrier Act and added the words "or indirectly" to
"whether directly or by a lease or any other arrangement." Not surprisingly,
the Civil Aeronautics Board concluded that Congress had aimed the term at
air freight forwarders. 50 In Railway Express Agency, Inc., s I Railway Express
Agency (REA) applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Since REA did not own or operate aircraft, it was not a direct air carrier.
REA collected shipments from the consignor, transported them to the
originating airport, consolidated the packages into a bulk package which
could be flown at a lower fare, and presented the bulk package under its own
name to the direct air carrier. When the package arrived at the terminal
airport, REA took delivery, broke the bulk package into its components, and
delivered the smaller packages to the individual consignees. REA contracted
with each direct air carrier that REA, not the direct carrier, would solicit and
promote the air express service. REA charged the consignor one rate,
covering the solicitation, promotion, and consolidation costs of REA as well
as the physical in-flight transportation. In conducting the air express business,
REA at no time operated its own aircraft; it purchased air capacity from the
46. United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425 (1924).
47. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, Pub. L. No. 255, 49 Stat. 543.
48. Id. § 203(14), 49 Stat. 543, 544.
49. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 2 M.C.C. 415, 420 (1937), rev'd, 8 M.C.C. 211 (1938), aff'd 30
F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 309 U.S. 638 (1940). A clear expression of the I.C.C.'s
usage appears in Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 8 M.C.C. 211, 215 (1938): "[A]pplicant's operations as
a carrier may for convenience be divided into those which are direct and those which are indirect.
The direct operations are those in which the carriage is performed by vehicles under the
immediate ownership or control of applicant and without utilization of the services of any other
carrier, and are confined to motor-vehicle operations. The indirect operations, which are much more
extensive, are those in which the services of other carriers, by rail, by water, or by motor vehicle, are
utilized."
50. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 538 (1941): "The conclusion is inescapable,
therefore, that the addition of the words 'or indirectly' in the definition of 'air carrier', at a time
when the Interstate Commerce Commission was dealing with operations which it terms 'indirect,'
reflected an intention to embrace within the regulatory provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act all
common carrier operations by air, whether direct or indirect, and that those who, as common
carriers, forward by air.. . should be 'air carriers.' No other conclusion reasonably could give
adequate context to the words 'or indirectly' as distinguished from the words 'or by a lease or any
other arrangement.' No other conclusion is necessarily required by the express terms of the Act."
51. Id.
1975]
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direct carriers by contract.5 2 Holding that REA was an indirect air carrier
and thus within the definition of section 101(3), 53 the Board stated:
[REA] holds out to the public that it will undertake to transport property by air, and
enters into contracts with shippers wherein it binds itself to discharge such an
undertaking with respect to particular shipments. So far as the shippers are concerned,
they are dealing solely with [REA) in obtaining transportation of their property by air.
Even though it be an intermediary between the shipper and the ultimate operator of
the aircraft in which the shipment is carried, it is apparent that [REAl is engaged in
the business of transporting property by air. Moreover, it is engaged in that business
as a common carrier.5 4
This first case holding that someone other than the operator of the aircraft
was an air carrier, illustrates several characteristics5 5 which singly or in some
combination may define the contours of an indirect air carrier. These elements
include: the holding out to the public that it will transport property or
passengers by air, the purchase of air capacity from an air carrier, the receipt
of compensation for the service, the provision of a service which includes
something in addition to direct air transportation, and the assumption of
responsibility for the air transportation as between the shipper/passenger and
the indirect air carrier. To determine the parameters of "not an air carrier" in
the definition of ticket agent, these elements must be examined as they relate
to air carriers and ticket agents.
B. Characteristics of Indirect Air Carriage
1. Holding Out to the Public
Under the Act, a party is not an air carrier if it is not a common carrier.5 6
Since the Act does not define common carriage, common law principles apply.
At common law, a common carrier is one who holds himself out to the public
as being engaged in the business of transporting persons or property for
compensation. 5 7 "Whether a transportation agency is a common carrier
depends not upon its corporate character or declared purposes, but upon what
it does. ' " The dominant characteristics of a common carrier are its public
profession or holding out of the service offered, 59 and its willingness to
perform the service for all who choose to apply.60 On the other hand, private
52. Id. at 532-33.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1970).
54. 2 C.A.B. at 536-37 (footnotes omitted).
55. Four of the five characteristics are discussed in Brief for Defendant at 7-14, CAB v.
Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No. 74 C 915 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 375
(2d Cir. 1975).
56. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(3), (10), & (21) (1970); see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
57. Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S. 207, 211 (1927);
Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 437 (1889).
58. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 181 (1936).
59. Id. at 182; Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 177 (1876).
60. McCallum v. United States, 298 F. 373, 375 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 606 (1924);
Kelly v. General Elec. Co., 110 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 204 F.2d 692 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953).
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carriers do not hold out to carry all persons indiscriminately but transport
only for themselves or for a specified, unchanging entity. 6 1
The Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted these common law principles,
stating that "[g]enerally speaking, a common carrier is defined as one who
holds himself out as ready and willing to undertake for hire the transportation
of passengers . . .from place to place, and so invites the patronage of the
public. ",
62
In Alaska Air Transport, Inc. v. Alaska Airplane Charter Co., 63 the court
set out a three-fold test of common carriage by air the air carrier must retain
the in-flight operation of the aircraft even though it yields the exclusive use of
the plane; the air carrier at least temporarily must hold out its service to the
public; and the air carrier must serve at least a limited portion of the public."
The CAB subsequently analyzed the last two elements of this test in the case
of an uncertificated direct air carrier which did not solicit business but only
accepted business that came to it.65 The CAB found the direct air carrier to
be engaged in common carriage, stating-
Regardless of the method by which it is done, the carrier has accomplished the holding
out if he has gotten the offer of available service across to the public .... "Holding
oneself out to the public does not necessarily consist in public declaration or adver-
tisement ... [O]ne who follows carrying for a livelihood, or who gives out to the
world in any intelligible way that he will take goods, chattels or persons for
transportation for hire, is a common carrier.1 66
Although the Board uses broad language, the courts have also held that an
air carrier may be holding out to the public when it holds out to a limited
group.67 A nonprofit cooperative flower shipping association provided a
drayage service to and from airports for its members. The association claimed
there had been no holding out of the service to the public but the Ninth
Circuit6 8 ruled that the association was an indirect air carrier: "[t]he service of
the cooperative seems to have been open to all who would join. There was
very active solicitation of memberships and, through memberships, busi-
ness."6 9 The court in effect equated "holding out the service to the public"
with "holding out the service to members who are solicited from the public."
The Seventh Circuit has recently extended this principle to members of a
nonprofit air travel club.70
61. Home Ins. Co. v. Riddell, 252 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1958); cf. Kelly v. General Elec. Co.,
110 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Pa.), affd mem., 204 F.2d 692 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953).
62. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 350, 352 (1950).
63. 72 F. Supp. 609 (D. Alas. 1947) (holding out by advertisement in newspapers and on
radio).
64. Id. at 610.
65. Joiner Investigation Case, 12 C.A.B. 879 (1951).
66. Id. at 883, quoting Stoner v. Underseth, 85 Mont. 11, 277 P. 437 (1929).
67. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974);
Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 213 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954).
68. Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 213 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954).
69. Id. at 817.
70. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974).
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Because an indirect air carrier is required to be a common carrier, it must
hold out its service to the public. A ticket agent by definition is not an air
carrier engaged in air transportation. It follows that a ticket agent is not a
common carrier and thus not an indirect air carrier. In two CAB cases, 71
parties have been classified as ticket agents and as such have been found
guilty of unfair or deceptive practices in violation of section 411. 72 In both
cases the respondents held out to the public that they were undertaking to
transport persons by air. They advertised that they were direct air carriers, 73
but in actuality they only provided the service of ticketing.74 The Board ruled
in each case that the advertising was in violation of section 411's prohibition
of unfair or deceptive practices since it was exactly this deceptive holding out
that Congress had sought to prevent when it passed the 1952 amendment
adding ticket agents to the Civil Aeronautics Act. 75
The problem in analyzing these cases is that the Board's decisions did not
depend on the status of the offenders. If the respondents had been held to be
indirect air carriers instead of ticket agents, they still would have been in
violation of section 411. An indirect air carrier which holds itself out as a
direct air carrier would be in violation of section 411 as would a ticket agent.
However, if a ticket agent holds itself out as an indirect air carrier, the
agent might actually be held to be an indirect air carrier. Because the
statutory overlap in definitions of ticket agent and indirect air carrier provide
a basis for such a decision, 76 there is some justification for the contention that
the mere holding out of indirect air transportation will be sufficient to make
the party an indirect air carrier. A ticket agent or tour operator who does not
wish to be classified as an indirect air carrier should take precautions not to
represent himself as an air carrier to the public or he may find himself
classified as such and in violation of the CAB regulations.
The air travel club owned and operated several planes exclusively for its members. Its member-
ship fees dropped from an original $125 to as low as $10. Memberships and flights were heavily
publicized. The court stated that an increase in membership alone did "not necessarily result In
the transformation from private to public carriage. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the ads
solicit[ed] prospective members where the membership is defined in such a manner as to be
undifferentiated from the traveling public at large." Id. at 801. See generally 7 Ind. L. Rev. 737,
738-39 (1974).
71. Southeast Airlines Agency, Inc., 25 C.A.B. 89 (1957); Airline Reservations, Inc., 18
C.A.B. 114 (1953).
72. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). Section 411 applies to both air carriers and ticket agents. See
note 27 supra.
73. Southeast Airlines Agency, Inc., 25 C.A.B. 89, 92 (1957); Airline Reservations, Inc., 18
C.A.B. 114, 118 (1953).
74. The respondent in Airline Reservations, Inc., 18 C.A.B. 114, 118 (1953), advertised "fly
NORTH STAR Aircoach" and distributed a brochure containing a picture of an aircraft with
"North Star" printed in large letters across the side. None of the ads or brochures indicated that
respondent was an agent of a supplemental air carrier.
75. Southeast Airlines Agency, Inc., 25 C.A.B. 89, 107 (1957); Airlines Reservations, Inc., 18
C.A.B. 114, 120-21 (1953); see notes 31-37 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 28-39 supra and accompanying text.
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2. Purchase of Air Capacity
Normally an indirect air carrier purchases air capacity, i.e., space on the
aircraft, by contract from a direct air carrier. 7 But other parties such as a
freight forwarder may purchase air capacity from an intervening indirect air
carrier and still be considered an indirect air carrier.
78
The Board has indicated that the purchase of air capacity is an assumption
of the economic risk of the venture7 9 and one who does assume such risk, such as
a tour operator80 who purchases air capacity in his own name for resale to the
public as part of a tour package, functions as an indirect air carrier. In such a
tour arrangement, "[tihere would be no direct contractual relationship between
[the direct air carrier] and the tour participants... ; the tour operator would act
as a middleman-entrepreneur between the producer and ultimate user of the air
transportation, assuming the risks and retaining the profits from the venture." 8'
A borderline case on the purchase of air capacity was National Air Taxi
Conference, Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane System, Inc. 8 2 Hertz entered into
licensing agreements with small direct carriers who received Hertz's nation-
wide promotion, merchandising, and reservation system in return for severe
restrictions on their freedom of operation and a percentage of the direct
carriers' gross rental receipts. The licensee entered into agreements directly
77. See Intra-Mar Shipping Corp., 27 C.A.B. 568, 570-72 (1958); Air Freight Forwarder Case, 9
C.A.B. 473, 479 (1948); Railway Express Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 532 (1941).
78. Universal Air Freight Corp., 3 C.A.B. 698 (1942). The freight forwarder had no choice
but to tender the shipment to Railway Express Agency because, at that time, Railway Express
Agency had "contracts with substantially all domestic airlines .. .under which such airlines
agree[d]. .. not to accept property for transportation by air from any other person." Id. at 700.
79. Group Tour Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803 (1966); accord, World Airways, Inc. v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966). A travel
agent entered into an agreement with a supplemental air carrier to purchase air capacity on a
number of flights. The parties attempted to make the contract an agency agreement to avoid
violation of the direct air carrier's certificate prohibition of selling air capacity to a travel agent.
The agency agreement, had it been upheld, would have avoided the Board's objection to the
travel agent acting as a principal or entrepreneur. But the First Circuit held that a clause
requiring the travel agent to pay liquidated damages if the required number of flights were not
purchased, defeated the agency relationship and violated the direct carrier's certificate.
If the travel agent were forced to pay liquidated damages, it would be purchasing the air
capacity as a principal or entrepreneur. According to the First Circuit, that would make it an
indirect air carrier. Id. at 1012-13.
80. 14 C.F.R. § 378.2(d) (1975) provides: " 'Tour operator' means any citizen . . . (other than a
direct U.S. air carrier), authorized hereunder to engage in the formation of groups for transporta-
tion on inclusive tours." This definition provides little help in separating the terms air carrier and
ticket agent. The problem is often mooted by the Board's exemption of the charter arranger from
the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The tour operator, whether
he is an indirect air carrier or not, can operate within the regulations and avoid costly litigation.
Or he can operate outside of the regulations and fight the classification of indirect air carrier
should the Board decide to take action against him. A number of charter arrangers evidently
have decided to operate outside of the regulations, resulting in "a large black market" of charter
flights. CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 390 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. Group Tour Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803, 804 (1966).
82. 31 C.A.B. 41 (1960).
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with the public;83 Hertz did not purchase air capacity from the licensee in its
own name or in the name of the passengers. Nevertheless, Hertz was held to
be an indirect air carrier and as such, operating without a certificate despite
an exculpation clause in all contracts relieving Hertz of any responsibility.
Hertz did not assume the full economic risk of the venture. It invested in
advertising and increased its reservation system, but at best, Hertz shared the
risk with the licensee.
Although the purchase element was weak in Hertz, the Board seemed
anxious to find Hertz within its jurisdiction because of the influential Hertz
name and the attempted exculpation of Hertz's responsibility in the actual
contract.84 Nevertheless, the Hertz case can be reconciled with earlier cases if
the licensing agreement is viewed as a purchase of air capacity, since it
guaranteed that the aircraft would be available to renters when and if Hertz
persuaded them to rent.85
The two cases previously discussed dealing with ticket agents8 6 also em-
phasized an agency relationship with the direct carrier. But as defined in the
Act, a ticket agent is not merely an "agent" in the traditional sense since he
may sell air transportation as a "principal".8 7 The cases have not clarified the
exact role of a ticket agent, but the possibility does exist that a ticket agent
may find himself classified as an indirect air carrier depending on the nature
of agreements with direct air carriers.
3. Receipt of Compensation
There is little doubt that an air carrier must receive compensation for the
service it provides. When an indirect air carrier purports to offer free air
transportation with a tour package consisting of services for which a fee
slightly below the normal air fare is charged, the indirect air carrier receives
compensation.88
The absence of profit in the operations of an air carrier is immaterial.8 9 A
nonprofit direct air carrier was not disqualified from the status of "a common
carrier for compensation or hire . . . .", since it was " 'furnishing . . .
transportation by air to the general public on a commercial basis.' "90 The
same rationale applies to a nonprofit indirect air carrier.91
83. Id. at 42-43.
84. See text accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
85. National Air Taxi Conference, Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane Sys., Inc., 31 C.A.B. 41,
43-44 (1960).
86. See notes 71-76 supra and accompanying text.
87. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(37) (Supp. 1975); see text accompanying note 30 supra.
88. M & R Investment Co. v. CAB, 308 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1962); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v.
CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
89. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974);
M & R Investment Co. v. CAB, 308 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1962); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB,
298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
90. Voyager 1000 v. CAB, 489 F.2d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982
(1974), quoting, Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430, 436 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 885 (1962).
91. Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 213 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954).
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Ticket agents generally receive a commission from the direct air carrier 92
and thus there would be little doubt that they meet the requirement that an
indirect air carrier must receive compensation for services rendered.
4. Service in Addition to Direct Air Transportation
The provision of an additional service is closely related to the compensation
characteristic since the air carrier will seek to be paid for the additional
service as well as for the flight fare. 93 Air forwarders provide surface
drayage94 and charter arrangers provide land accommodations" in addition
to the air transportation. In each case, it is a service which is more than the
flight alone.
Consolidation of passengers into groups to achieve a lower per passenger
fare is analogous to the activity of air freight forwarders. One court96 held
that a social club whose primary purpose was to consolidate "groups of
passengers to fill the [aircraft] space" 97 was in violation of the Act as an
uncertificated indirect air carrier. Similarly, the creation of a nationwide
reservation system with a network of licensees willing to rent planes was
sufficient to place one in the category of indirect air carrier.98
It may be argued that at a minimum a ticket agent provides a service of
convenient flight arrangements. But this service is so closely associated with
the flight as to be inseparable from it" and in itself, it would probably be an
insufficient basis for including a ticket agent within the classification of air
carrier.
5. Assumption of Responsibility
In one of the early CAB cases 00 defining the role of air freight forwarders,
the Board stated that in addition to holding out the service to the public and
even though an intervening forwarder existed between the air freight forwar-
92. H.R. Rep. No. 2420, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
93. Although the fare is composed of two parts-flight expense and additional service
expense-the consumer is quoted one fare. See, e.g., Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas
Airways Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 88 (D. Hawiii 1974); Group Tour Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803
(1966).
94. Consolidated Flower Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 213 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954); Railway
Express, Air-Surface Cargo Agreements, 39 C.A.B. 860 (1964).
95. M & R Investment Co. v. CAB, 308 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1962) (hotel accommodations); CAB
v. International Exch. School, 357 F. Supp. 819 (D. Utah 1973) (study abroad); Group Tour
Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803 (1966) (lodging plus sight seeing trip, ground transportation, car
rental, or meals).
96. Monarch Travel Services, Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973).
97. Id. at 553.
98. National Air Taxi Conference, Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane Sys., Inc., 31 C.A.B. 41,
42-43 (1960); see text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
99. The respondents in Southeast Airlines Agency, Inc., 25 C.A.B. 89 (1957), provided some
baggage service in their own name, but evidently no other additional service was provided by the
ticket agents. This is in contrast to most of the indirect air carrier cases where a substantial
additional service was provided to the consumer.
100. Universal Air Freight Corp., 3 C.A.B. 698 (1942).
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der and the direct air carrier, "[r]espondent receives shipments, assumes
control of them, transports the shipments at the beginning and end of the
journey, and assumes the responsibility that the property will be transported
from the original consignor to the ultimate consignee."'' ° The freight forward-
er was bound by contract to move the property from the consignor to the
consignee. The Board's position consistently has been that if there is an actual
assumption of the responsibility the party will be treated as an indirect air
carrier. 102
The CAB analyzed the Hertz Rent A Plane activities as an assumption of
responsibility by Hertz for the provision of the air transportation.' 0 3 Hertz,
however, was a licensor, not the owner/operator of the aircraft. Nevertheless,
the Board held that Hertz so obscured the name of the direct air carrier that,
as far as the passengers were concerned, Hertz had provided the transporta-
tion. From the facts, it appeared that Hertz held out that it would be
responsible for the transportation even though it did not actually assume that
responsibility. The Board said:
The passenger is unaware of any other party other than Hertz to the rental agreement
for the use of a plane until he reads the "smaller" print on the reverse side of the
agreement which contains an exculpation clause absolving Hertz from legal responsi-
bility for the passenger's carriage.10 4
Hertz made a deliberate attempt not to assume the responsibility. The
Board's decision is not clear 0 5 as to whether it denied effect to the exculpa-
tion clause thereby requiring Hertz actually to assume the responsibility, or
whether the exculpation clause failed to negate an apparent assumption of
responsibility. If apparant assumption of responsibility, rather than actual
assumption, is sufficient, the term indirect air carrier is broadened considera-
bly.
The form of the ticket issued may determine whether a ticket agent has
assumed or has appeared to assume responsibility for his customers' transpor-
tation. The ticket agents in both Southeast Airlines Agency, Inc. 106 and
Airline Reservations, Inc. 107 issued exchange orders which could not be
honored legally by an air carrier under the regulations as promulgated by the
101. Id. at 706.
102. E.g., Brief for Plaintiff, CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No. 74 C 915 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 30, 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975); National Air Taxi Conference, Inc. v.
Hertz Rent A Plane Sys., Inc., 31 C.A.B. 41, 43-45 (1960); Hacienda Hotels--U.S. Aircoach, 26
C.A.B. 372, 376 (1958); Universal Air Freight Corp., 3 C.A.B. 698, 705 (1942); Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 531, 536-37 (1941).
103. National Air Taxi Conference, Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane Sys., Inc. 31 C.A.B. 41
(1960).
104. Id. at 44.
105. "Certainly an operation, such as advertised to be provided by respondent herein, cannot
escape regulation by merely inserting an exculpation clause in small type on the reverse side of a
contract for hire. The public interest demands that the identity of the contracting parties as well
as the responsibilities be clearly established." Id. at 45.
106. 25 C.A.B. 89 (1957).
107. 18 C.A.B. 114 (1953).
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Board.10 8 The difference between a ticket and an exchange order "is material,
because the purchaser who believes he has a commitment on behalf of an air
carrier binding such carrier to provide transportation has in fact no rights as
against any air carrier but merely a claim against [a ticket agent]."' 0 9
The ticket agents had represented that they would provide the direct air
transportation, and as such had assumed apparent responsibility to provide
the flight. But if they had not so represented themselves, there would have
been no assumption of responsibility.
IV. ToWNARD A DEFINrrIoN
Any reconciliation of the statutory terms "air carrier" and "ticket agent"
must center around the phrase "not an air carrier" in the definition of ticket
agent. 110 Absent that phrase, the terms overlap so substantially that most
indirect air carriers would be ticket agents. Since air carriers were defined in
the original 1938 Act and ticket agents were not added until 1952, fourteen
years later, it seems apparent that the statute directs that inquiry first be
addressed to the question of whether the party is an air carrier. If the party is
found not to be an air carrier, then the question of whether the party is a
ticket agent is reached. Put succinctly, no question arises under the definition
of a ticket agent until and unless it is concluded that the party is not an
indirect air carrier. As a corollary observation, the definition of a ticket agent
cannot be manipulated to restrict the scope of the term indirect air carrier.
The legislative history of the 1952 amendment 1 ' clearly shows that the
addition of ticket agents to the Act enabled the Board to acquire jurisdiction,
albeit limited jurisdiction, over parties who exhibit some of the characteristics
of indirect air carriers, or, perhaps, exhibit all of these characteristics but not
in sufficient quantum to justify the Board's extension of regulation to them.
The cases illustrate that an indirect air carrier demonstrates a combination
of five characteristics: holding out to the public that it will transport property
or passengers by air, the purchase of air capacity from an air carrier, receipt
of compensation for the service, provision of a service which includes
something in addition to direct air transportation, and the assumption of
responsibility for the air transportation as between the shipper/passenger and
the indirect air carrier. While not all of the elements are discussed in every
case involving the definition of an indirect air carrier, they do outline the
contours of an indirect air carrier. The varied factual situations in which the
elements appear support the theory that the characteristics are a test of
indirect air carriage rather than merely factual repetitives.
108. "It is the policy of the Board to regard any of the following enumerated practices (among
others) by a ticket agent as an unfair or deceptive practice or unfair method of competition ....
(k) Selling or issuing tickets or other documents to passengers to be exchanged or used for air
transportation knowing or having reason to know or believe that such tickets or other documents
will not be or cannot be legally honored by air carriers for air transportation." 14 C.F.R. § 399.80
(1975).
109. Airline Reservations, Inc., 18 C.A.B. 114, 115 (1953).
110. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(37) (Supp. 1975).
111. H.R. Rep. No. 2420, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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The elements of an indirect air carrier provide a guide to the role of charter
arrangers. Their classification under the Act depends upon their methods of
operation. If a charter arranger holds out that it will provide ground tours in
connection with air transportation provided by a supplemental air carrier, it
has not held out that it will provide air transportation.
It is difficult for a charter arranger not to purchase air capacity in its own
name because the supplemental air carrier requires a firm commitment well in
advance of the flight. The charter group, however, is not formed by the
charter arranger until a time close to the flight. A contingent contract with a
supplemental air carrier which provides for an assumption of liability by the
charter participants at a set time prior to the flight might be a solution to the
problem. Such a contract should not contain a liquidated damages clause. 2 2
An itemized payment for the tour would further emphasize the distinction
between the land tour and the air transportation and it would distinguish the
ground tour as a specific service of the tour arranger rather than as a service
in addition to the air transportation. Finally, a charter arranger should make
it clear to the charter participant that the supplemental air carrier is responsi-
ble for the aircraft. Although the charter arranger may help the tour group
find a new supplemental air carrier should the original one fail, there should
be no actual assumption of the responsibility for providing the air transporta-
tion.
Because of the limited number of cases discussing ticket agents, the contours
of a ticket agent are defined less clearly. However, the paucity of decisions
involving a ticket agent may be an indication that in borderline cases the
Board and the courts will hold the party to be an indirect air carrier.' 13 The
Civil Aeronautics Board continues to assert1 14 a definition of indirect air
carrier, first enunciated in Hacienda Hotels-U.S. Aircoach:
[I]t is the view of the Board that in general, a person not directly engaged in the
operation of an aircraft is an indirect carrier if such person sells transportation by
aircraft to the general public other than as an authorized agent of a direct carrier in the
consummation of transportation arrangements between the operator of an aircraft and
the passengers.'"
But to say that the distinction between air carriers and ticket agents depends
on an authorized agency of the direct air carrier contradicts the statute. A
ticket agent may, as principal or agent, sell or offer for sale any air
transportation. Nevertheless, in CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc.,116 the Second
Circuit recently approved the CAB rationale holding: "the CAB quite prop-
erly argues that by selling aircraft transportation to the general public other
112. Group Tour Excursion Fares, 44 C.A.B. 803 (1966); see note 79 supra.
113. The most notable example is National Air Taxi Conference, Inc. v. Hertz Rent A Plane
Sys., Inc., 31 C.A.B. 41 (1960).
114. Brief for Plaintiff at 18, CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No. 74 C 915 (E.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 30, 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975). The brief was submitted in the form of a
proposed opinion of the court.
115. 26 C.A.B. 372, 385 (1958).
116. 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975).
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than as an authorized agent of a direct carrier and by consummating
transportation arrangements, the [defendants] have acted as indirect car-
riers."'1 17 This analysis in effect reads "as principal" out of the statute.
The lower court had advocated policy considerations when it held the
defendant to be an indirect air carrier. I 18 To hold otherwise, according to the
court, would allow the defendant to subvert the statute by permitting it to do
those things which are forbidden to the holder of a certificate.' 9 Again, the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court and endorsed the CAB position that
the defendants "were indirect air carriers in the sense that they were 'usurp-
ing' air carrier functions, and functions which were in violation of CAB
regulations. '1 20 While the policy underlying a statute is important, it is not
helpful to the potential charter arranger or ticket agent who looks to the law
as a guide for his conduct. While the Second Circuit may feel "that there are
no rigid requirements for being an indirect air carrier . .. , 1 there are some
identifiable characteristics which may help the potential entrant into the
charter field decide whether he is subject to the CAB's regulations as an
indirect air carrier. Depending upon the organization and operation of such
individuals, one or a combination of these characteristics may be sufficient to
bring them under the ambit of the CAB. The CAB will probably continue to
attempt to broaden its jurisdiction and until the courts provide a more precise
definition, charter organizers would be wise to structure their organization so
as to avoid, as far as possible, any of the five characteristics which have been
used to describe indirect air carriers.
Beth E. Wortman
117. Id. at 387.
118. CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., Civil No. 74 C 915 at 47-49 (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 1974).
aff'd, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975).
119. Id.
120. 513 F.2d at 388.
121. Id.
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